This paper revisits the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates using a simple model that incorporates the role of exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices and distinguishes between cases of expansionary and contractionary depreciations. The model results show that the correlation between exchange rates and interest rates, conditional on an adverse risk premium shock, is negative for expansionary depreciations and positive for contractionary ones. For this type of shock, interest rates are found to be raised to prevent the contractionary effect of a depreciation regardless of whether the latter effect is strong or mild. Interest rates are predicted to eventually rise in response to an adverse net export shock in contractionary depreciation cases, and to be lowered in the case of expansionary ones.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been strong research interest in the link between exchange rates and interest rates in both advanced and developing countries. This is understandable, given the important role these variables play in determining developments in the nominal and real sides of the economy, including the behavior of domestic inflation, real output, exports and imports. Among emerging market economies (EME), this interest is further spurred by the fact that many of them have recently introduced changes in their monetary and exchange rate policies, moving to inflation targeting frameworks that operate officially under flexible exchange rate regimes. Exchange rate 44 M. Sanchez variability -in itself and vis-à-vis interest rate variability -has, in recent years, risen compared to previous periods characterized by far more rigid exchange rate regimes, even if the extent of such fluctuations is still a matter of debate. Some middle-income Asian countries have all declared that their currencies have floated in the postAsian-crisis period, accompanied by a switch to inflation targeting. Such moves were taken by South Korea in 1998, Indonesia in 2000, Thailand in 2000, and the Philippines in 2001. In Latin America, inflation targeting has been adopted by Chile in 1990 (together with an exchange rate float only since 1999), Mexico and Colombia in 1999 , Brazil in 2000 , and Peru in 2002 . Among Eastern and Central European countries, the EU new member states of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have also moved to comparable monetary and exchange rate policy frameworks (in 1998, 2001 and 1999, respectively) , while South Africa and Israel count among other middle-income inflation targeters. 1 In the case of EMEs, both theoretical and empirical work should take into consideration the specificities of these economies regarding the behavior of interest rates and exchange rates. Authors such as Calvo (2001) , Calvo and Reinhart (2001a and and Eichengreen (2005) have insisted that there are a number of important differences between advanced economies and EMEs. These differences include the presence of liability dollarization, credibility problems, a high degree of exchange rate pass-through 2 and non-stationarities in the inflationary process. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) find that these specificities of EMEs are responsible for a relatively small degree of exchangerate flexibility in these economies -what the authors label 'fear of floating'. 3 Balance sheet affects that raise the domestic-currency real value of external liabilities have, in recent years, particularly attracted the attention of analysts, who look for mechanisms through which a weakening in domestic currencies could lead to contractions in economic activity (that is, the existence of 'contractionary devaluations'). Velasco (2003, 2004) focus on the role of liability dollarization on output via its effect on risk premia, finding that it is unlikely for weaker exchange rates to induce a recession. 4 According to Mohanty and Klau (2004) , Eichengreen (2005) and Cavoli and Rajan (2005) , 'contractionary devaluations' are a broader concept to be interpreted as an overall negative effect of weaker real exchange rates on output in the aggregate demand schedule. The empirical literature has generally found evidence that devaluations/depreciations are contractionary, even after including a number of different controls (see for example Ahmed 2003, and Sánchez 2007) .
The present paper revisits the link between interest rates and exchange rates in small open economies under flexible exchange rates, distinguishing between cases when depreciations are expansionary and contractionary. By doing the latter, I extend the previous literature analysing the role of the exchange rate in the conduct of monetary policy in small open economies, which has mostly assumed that depreciations are expansionary. 5 Depreciations are defined to be contractionary when weak real exchange rates have an overall negative effect on output in the aggregate demand schedule. I set up a simple macroeconomic model, which builds on Gerlach and Smets' (2000) framework. As in the original specification, I use backward-looking inflationary expectations and forward-looking financial markets. 6 I incorporate two significant extensions in that I allow for exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices, and consider both cases when depreciations are expansionary and contractionary.
The main results of the paper are the following. I find that the covariance between exchange rates and interest rates, conditional on adverse risk premium shocks, is negative for expansionary depreciations and positive for contractionary ones. Interest rates are raised to limit the adverse effect of depreciations on real output, not only if the latter effect is (unrealistically) strong enough -as found by Eichengreen (2005) -but also when it is relatively mild. In the case of an adverse net export shock, the dominant feature regarding interest rates is that they are predicted to rise in response to the shock in contractionary depreciation cases, and to be lowered in the case of expansionary ones. As with the risk premium shock, the covariance between exchange rates and interest rates is negative for expansionary depreciations and positive for contractionary ones. The exact timing of such a response of interest rates and exchange rates depends on the nature of the reaction of aggregate demand to the value of the domestic currency. Overall, interest rates are found to react differently to shocks depending on whether depreciations are expansionary or contractionary. Exchange rate smoothing by means of interest rates -which in the literature falls under the category of 'fear of floating' -is thus shown to originate in optimal policy under flotation.
The next section briefly discusses some of the empirical evidence concerning the behavior of exchange rates and interest rates in EMEs. The section after presents a simple small open economy model which I use to derive the optimal monetary policy rule and solve for equilibrium trajectories. I illustrate the workings of the model by attaching numerical values to the parameters, focusing on the link between interest rates to exchange rates. Finally, the fourth section concludes.
Discussion of some empirical evidence
Despite the increasing literature on the macroeconomic transmission mechanism in EMEs, not much is known about structural responses of macro variables in these economies, partly due to the only recent introduction of suitable empirical methods and the insufficient theoretical understanding of the channels involved. This section assesses the empirical evidence on whether interest rates are used by policymakers to smooth or even reverse the effect of macroeconomic shocks on exchange rates. After briefly reviewing the literature questioning de jure classifications on exchange rate regimes, I turn to some historical episodes during which some Asian and Latin American countries were hit by shocks to risk premium and international trade.
The IMF has, for a long time, followed that practice of classifying exchange rate regimes by simply reporting member countries' self-selected views about how their exchange rate are determined. Over the last ten years, such de jure classifications have indicated the tendency for an increasing number of countries to choose either a pegged exchange rate regime or permit their currency to float freely, in what would supposedly represent a move toward a 'corner' solution. A burgeoning literature has recently questioned the notion of such 'bipolar' configuration of exchange rate regimes. First, some of the skeptics have pointed to a 'fear of floating' whereby countries that declare themselves floaters nevertheless intervene regularly to prevent full flexibility of the exchange rate. The key paper in this area is Calvo and Reinhart (2002) . They use a cross-section of 153 countries that includes data on the volatility of interest rates, nominal exchange rates, money aggregates, international reserves, and commodity prices. They report that exchange rate variability in official floating regimes in EMEs is smaller than in a benchmark of advanced countries -such as the USnormally seen as displaying fully floating exchange rates. In addition, they find that the volatility of interest rates, money aggregates and international reserves is larger than in the benchmark, which leads them to conclude that EMEs use monetary policy to limit the volatility of exchange rates. Second, other authors have pointed out that some countries display an aversion to truly fixing their exchange rate, preferring 46 M. Sanchez instead to allow for the contingency that the existing peg may be altered either if it becomes too costly to defend, or macroeconomic conditions require a realignment of some kind (Willett 2003) . In parallel, a number of studies have recently proposed the need of and/or developed de facto exchange regime classification as opposed to the IMF-type de jure one (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Shambaugh, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005) .
In line with the previous literature on de facto classifications on exchange rate regimes, some studies have analysed the behavior of individual variables such as exchange rates and interest rates in EMEs against the benchmark of small open advanced economies. These studies normally find that in those EMEs that have abandoned hard pegs the variability of exchange rates -in itself and with respect to that in interest rates -has increased markedly in recent years, while still being below that observed in the benchmark cases (see, for example, IMF, 2004, and the literature cited therein). One such analysis is presented in Eichengreen (2004) , who explores Korean exchange rate and monetary policies. He finds that, despite wider exchange rate fluctuations now compared with the period prior to the Asian crisis, the Bank of Korea has attempted to control the won's movements. This indicates that Korean policymakers care about the exchange rate -and not only because its movements provide information relevant for the inflation forecast. Finally, some studies have found that exchange rates play a role, together with more standard arguments such as economic activity and inflation, in interest rate rules for EMEs (see, for example Caputo, 2004) .
In the rest of the section, I take a closer look at the connection between interest rates and exchange rates in EMEs. I consider some historical episodes that are characterized by sharp fluctuations in nominal and sometimes real macroeconomic variables. These episodes refer to three groups: (i) some Asian EMEs at the time of the Asian crisis (1997) (1998) ; (ii) some Latin American countries at the time of the Asian crisis (1997) and the Russian default (1998); and (iii) a couple of later periods of financial turmoil in Brazil (1999 Brazil ( and 2002 Brazil ( -2003 . 7 I use these case studies as motivation for theoretical discussions about the link between exchange rates and interest rates featuring in the next section of the paper. Over recent years, a considerable consensus has emerged as to which were some of the key forces at play in these episodes, in particular regarding the nature of the financial and real shocks impacting the economies at those times. It is worth stressing, though, that there is no presumption here that the current section is in itself a validation of the theoretical analysis that will follow, but rather serves as motivation for it. Even more, the theory motivated by this evidence in the present paper is explicitly designed to yield implications that stand the chance of being rejected by such structural empirical methods.
Figures 1 through 3 show the behavior of real effective exchange rates (REER) and short-term interest rates -together with some other macroeconomic variables -for the episodes analysed in this section. Figure 1 reports the situation in some Asian EMEs, namely, Malaysia, South Korea (henceforth Korea) and Thailand, during the Asian crisis (1997) (1998) . The Asian crisis is best characterized as triggered by a confidence crisis in a few countries, which then spread -through trade and, depending on the country, also financial channels -to other countries within and outside the region. Part of the responsibility for the confidence crisis is to be assigned to weak fundamentals, and especially sizeable current account deficits in the three selected countries. 8 Figure 1 shows that, as a result of the crisis, exchange rates weakened considerably over the second half of 1997. Interest rate hikes were instrumental in reversing the drop in exchange rates over 1998 (top and bottom left panels). The exception to this is Malaysia, which imposed capital controls in August 1997, while still experiencing exchange rate depreciations until it finally re-pegged its currency against the US dollar in September 1998 (IMF, 1999) . 9 Over time, the crisis was transmitted internationally via financial and trade spillovers. The latter channel receives support from international trade data for Emerging Asian economies. Reduced real incomes and sometimes competitive depreciations eventually induced falls in both exports and imports across the region. Concentrating on our three countries, Figure 1 shows that the volume of trade 10 contracted before starting to recover as the economic situation later improved (top and bottom left panels). While the recovery in exports began in 1998, imports began to rebound only in 1999. The region's exports and imports were in part influenced by macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates, interest rates and real output.
Figures 2 and 3 refer to some Latin American experiences. Figure 2 shows some developments in the region in the aftermath of the Asian crisis (1997) (1998) (1999) . In 1997, and as a consequence of the Asian crisis itself, interest rates were hiked as a response to financial contagion from Asia, with the outcome of strengthening the Brazilian exchange rate (first oval, top panel). At the time of the Russian crisis (summer of 1998), the currencies of Chile and Brazil depreciated and interest rates went up (second oval, top panel, and oval, central panel). The largest South American countries were during this period going through a process of reduction in domestic absorption, which implied a fall in imports including those from neighboring countries (rectangle, bottom panel). This added to global conditions leading to a deterioration in the terms of trade (ECLAC 2000) . For this reason, the period is best characterized as one of joint adverse financial and real (net export) shocks. with Brazil's experience in early 1999, interest rate hikes helped unwind and eventually reverse the downward course in the value of the real.
The analysis of these case studies does not provide us with an entirely clear picture of the workings of EMEs. It appears however to be the case that, in response to adverse risk premium shocks, the exchange rate has tended to depreciate on impact, thereafter strengthening alongside interest rate hikes. This has been the case of Brazil in the three episodes considered above; namely, the turbulent periods of 1997, 1999, and 2002-2003 . The situation is less clear-cut when it comes to shocks characterized by a fall in net exports, which in the cases analysed before, has taken place alongside adverse shocks to risk premia. In the case of Korea and Thailand at the time of the Asian crisis, the picture is similar to the case of an adverse risk premium shock alone; that is, the exchange rate appreciated as interest rates were raised. In contrast, in the cases of Chile and Brazil at the time of the 1998 Russian crisis, interest rates were hiked even as the exchange rate depreciated. The discrepancy in responses to a mixture of similar risk premium and net export shocks could be rationalized in four different ways. First, one could argue that the two shocks considered here work in opposite directions with regard to the exchange rate, explaining why in some cases the latter depreciates while in others it strengthens. Second, responses to either one or both of the shocks analysed here depend on the structural characteristics of the economies under study in ways that vary substantially from one to the other. Third, it could be that the two shocks under study happened to take place at the same time as another shock (or a combination thereof) was hitting the economy in a way that explains the discrepancy. Fourth, it could be that reactions to shocks are accompanied by non-fundamental behavior of a completely random nature, thereby failing to follow any predictable pattern.
I next set up a simple macroeconomic model which will help me better characterize some of the issues arising from the previous case studies.
A simple model
In order to investigate the link between interest rates and exchange rates, let us consider a simple small open economy model. I allow for depreciations to be either expansionary or contractionary. The economy specializes in the production of a single good. Four 50 M. Sanchez equations describe the behavior of the private sector:
(1)
where all variables, except the interest rate, are in logarithms and are expressed as deviations from steady state values. All parameters are assumed to be positive, with the exception of δ, which can adopt any real value. The value of δ is negative in a contractionary depreciation and positive in an expansionary depreciation. All shocks are of the zero-mean, constant variance, type, and are uncorrelated with each other. Aggregate supply schedule (Equation (1)) links inflation (π t ) to the output gap (y t ) term and an exchange-rate pass through term. An increase in the real exchange rate (e t ) denotes an appreciation. Expression (2) states that aggregate demand is decreasing in the real interest rate (r t ). Output is also allowed to depend positively or negatively on the real exchange rate. Equation (3) is an uncovered interest parity condition, while Equation (4) is the Fisher equation.
The modelling approach pursued here extends previous work by Gerlach and Smets (2000) , while also allowing a more general treatment of the impact of depreciations, as in Eichengreen (2005) . It is worth comparing the present set-up with the recent models on liability dollarization and balance sheet effects of Velasco (2003 and . The latter authors put special emphasis on the adverse impact of a depreciation on investment. This effect involves a fall in net worth as a result of liability dollarization, which in turn induces a higher risk premium. Consumption is assumed to be carried out by workers, and is proportional to output and thus indirectly driven by past investment. Finally, the authors set exports to a constant value. The model used here is not so specific concerning the effects of a depreciation, while accommodating in particular for a more general treatment of aggregate demand. It is consistent with liability dollarization playing a role in determining investment, in line with Céspedes et al. This can be incorporated by defining the real return to capital r K t to be equal to the sum of the expected real depreciation (which features in the present UIP equation) and an endogenous risk premium component that increases as a result of a depreciation. The aggregate demand equation used here also accommodates for a general treatment of net exports and consumption. I enable net export volumes to be lifted by a depreciation, while consumption is allowed to react to interest rates and a depreciation (in both cases negatively). With regard to the adverse effect of a depreciation on consumption, the literature suggests that consumption may fall as a result of lower real wages, lower real money balances or the reduction in credit volumes. 13 The central bank minimizes an intertemporal loss function given by 14
where
Policy makers thus care about both deviations of output from its potential level, y t − ε S t , and deviations of inflation from the target (or objective), π t −π t . The central bank has no incentive to surprise the private sector with inflation even in the presence of supply shocks. As a result there is no inflation bias. In addition, the loss function implies that the central bank cares about an index of prices including both domestic and imported goods. I assume that the public knows α, β and δ, the distribution of the disturbances ε S t , ε D t and ε f t , and that it observes the nominal interest and exchange rates. I also assume that there is full information, in the sense that the central bank, producers and foreign exchange market participants all observe current output, prices and nominal exchange rates. 15 With this information, and knowledge of the structure of the model, they are in a position to deduce the sources of the shocks that hit the economy. A statecontingent reaction function is then feasible. Using Equation (1), the central bank's full information reaction function can be rewritten as
To solve the model, it is convenient to think of the central bank as choosing π t to minimize its loss function. The first-order condition valid for optimal policy under discretion is
where ϕ ≡ χ/(1 + χ). Imposing rational expectations, we have
that is, expected inflation equals expected targeted inflation. Substituting Equation (8) back into Equation (7), I obtain the following expression for the optimal inflation rate, π opt t :
The central bank thus chooses an inflation rate equal to the term capturing the effect of unexpected exchange rate fluctuations on prices, plus a weighted average of the private sector's expectations of the inflation target and the actual inflation target.
Using Equations (1), (2) and (9), the expression for the central bank's reaction function in terms of the real short-term interest rate is found to be:
where ε xd t ≡ ε D t − ε S t . Equation (10) is an optimal reaction function and states that the interest rate should be raised to offset positive unexpected excess demand pressures, and that it should fall if the inflation target is relaxed or the real exchange rate strengthens as given by the last two terms.
Expressing the interest rate in terms of the exogenous processes driving the economy requires consideration of the dynamic properties of the model. In order to proceed, I assume for simplicity that the inflation target adopts a fixed and credible value ofπ , and that the risk premium shock, ε f t , and the disturbances underlying the excess demand shock, ε xd t , both follow first-order autoregressive processes that are uncorrelated with 
where ω ≡ δ/(β + δ) and θ ≡ 1/(β + δ). Examination of Equation (11) leads to the conclusion that the model has a forward solution for the case when |1 − ω| < 1, and a backward solution for the case when |1 − ω| > 1. In the rest of the section, I solve for each case in turn.
Forward solution for case when |1 − ω| < 1 The condition |1 − ω| < 1 amounts to two different ranges for the values of δ, namely, δ ∈ (−∞, −2β) ∪ (0, ∞). The forward solution to expectational difference Equation (11) in the absence of bubbles is given by
where σ ≡ α/(α + θϕγ ). Next, I derive the central bank's reaction function in terms of the policy instrument, which I take to be the real interest rate. It is worth stressing, though, that, given that inflation expectations are anchored atπ , the choice of real versus nominal interest rates proves to be insubstantial, as they are equal when measured as deviations from steady-state. Equations (3) and (12) lead to
Thus, the central bank raises interest rates in response to a positive excess demand shock and an unfavorable risk premium shock. Note that Equations (9) and (13) both describe the central bank's optimal policy. Equation (9) characterizes optimal policy in terms of the goal variable of the central bank, but does not give any guidance as to how to achieve the inflation target. Under condition |1 − ω| < 1, Equation (13) expresses monetary policy decisions in terms of the interest rate instrument.
Let us now illustrate the workings of the model by means of simulations. In order to do so, I attach numerical values to the parameters, following calibrations used in previous work for small open economies. Given the dearth of similar exercises for EMEs, the core of these parameter values is taken from calibrations for small open advanced economies. The values of α, β and γ are taken from Ball (1999) to equal 0.4, 0.6 and 0.2, respectively. For key parameter δ, I choose three different values: 0.2 as in Ball (1999) for the analysis of economies exhibiting expansionary depreciations, and two negative values for the study of contractionary depreciations: −1.5 for simulations in the present subsection satisfying δ < −2β, and −0.1 for use in the next subsection. The latter value for δ is close to Cavoli and Rajan's (2005) estimate of −0.09 for contractionary-depreciation Thailand. I draw from Nelson (1999, 2000) for parameters of shock persistence. The two I use in the present paper are ρ f = 0. I study impulse responses of interest rates and exchanges rates to two shocks in turn, one real (a favorable net export shock raising η xd t ) and the other a pure portfolio disturbance shock (an adverse risk premium shock pushing ξ t up). I analyse these simulations for the two cases mentioned before, namely, those of a positive δ and a rather negative δ (δ < −2β). 17 Figure 4 shows, for positive δ, the cumulated impulse responses to both a 1% adverse risk premium shock (top panel) and a 1% favorable net export shock (bottom panel). Figure 5 reports the corresponding cumulated impulse responses for δ < −2β.
For an economy exhibiting conventional expansionary depreciations, Figure 4 (top panel) indicates that an adverse risk premium shock drives the interest rate up and the real exchange rate down. A risk premium shock causes a real exchange rate depreciation with consequent inflationary effects via pass-through. Owing to its (conventional) positive impact on output via 'pro-competitiveness' effects, the currency depreciation has incipient positive output effects. In view of the unambiguous inflationary pressures stemming from this shock (via both the exchange rate pass-through and aggregate supply channels), the monetary authority raises interest rates. It is worth stressing that this monetary policy response is optimal from the perspective of inflation and output stabilization. It is thus not to be mistakenly interpreted as a 'fear of floating '. 18 It is worth mentioning that the dynamic behavior in interest rates and exchange rates is driven by the autoregressive process in the risk premium. Figure 4 (bottom panel) shows that a favorable net export shock drives both the interest rate and real exchange rate up. This is a foreign shock that is not in itself of the financial but the real-sector variety. It can be viewed as a positive terms-of-trade or external demand shock. The responses of the interest rate and real exchange are probably best understood by looking at expression (10). The interest rate is raised following an increase in η xd t . The interest rate hike puts a limit to the increase in aggregate demand, while also being instrumental to the strengthening of the exchange rate via the UIP schedule. The latter strengthening in turn helps ease excess demand and inflationary pressures. Unlike the dynamics described for the case of a risk premium shock, interest rates and the exchange rate go back to steady-state after the first period due to the assumption that ρ x = 0.
I now turn to the study of an economy exhibiting strongly contractionary depreciations (δ < −2β). Figure 5 (top panel) indicates that an adverse risk premium shock induces a rise in both interest rates and the real exchange rate. This disturbance causes a real exchange rate depreciation with consequent inflationary effects via the pass-through. Compared with the case of a positive δ, the shock would in addition have an incipient contractionary impact on aggregate demand. Interest rates are hiked in the present case to a point where exchange rates end up stronger. This is the adequate monetary response since a higher exchange rate both damps down inflationary pressures and stabilizes the real economy by, say, strengthening balance sheets. Figure 5 (bottom panel) reports that a favorable net export shock drives both interest rates and the real exchange rate down. In the conventional case, a positive shock that raises export demand must be offset by a stronger exchange rate. The result is the opposite here because the appreciation would exacerbate, rather than ease, the excess demand conditions in the goods market. 19 The economy instead settles in an equilibrium characterized by an exchange-rate depreciation which reduces demand. This depreciation still accommodates a fall in the interest rate as required by the UIP condition (augmented in this case with the risk premium shock).
In sum, I find that the covariance between exchange rates and interest rates, conditional on an adverse risk premium shock, is negative for expansionary depreciations and positive for contractionary ones. In particular, under contractionary depreciations, the authorities react to the disturbance by jacking up interest to the point of even strengthening the value of domestic currency. This is consistent with the evidence presented in the previous section. In the face of an adverse net export shock, interest rates are predicted to rise in economies characterized by strongly contractionary depreciations, and to be lowered in the case of expansionary ones. The inconclusive finding in the previous section that in practice net export shocks may produce ambiguous effects receives no correspondence in the theoretical analysis. Indeed, net export shocks are here found to produce clear-cut predictions.
In the final paragraph of the previous section, I outlined four candidate explanations for the inconclusive results arising from historical responses to net export shocks. Given that for all countries studied there, depreciations coexisted with output contractions, it is worth checking for a correspondence between facts and theory for the case δ < −2β. In this case, adverse external shocks of both the financial and real-side varieties would produce the same results for interest rates and exchange rates, namely, both of these variables should go up. This is consistent with the experience of Korea and Thailand during 1997-1998 . However, the experiences of Chile and Brazil in 1998, when exchange rates depreciated but interest rates went up, are hard to reconcile with the model predictions. One possible rationalization is that other shocks hitting the economy at the same time could be responsible for the discrepancies in EMEs' historical responses to an apparently similar configuration of shocks. Before reaching a final conclusion on this matter, it is necessary to analyze the model results for the range of δ not yet explored (mildly contractionary depreciations). This is done in the next subsection.
Backward solution for case when
The condition |1 − ω| > 1 refers to the following range of parameter values for δ: δ ∈ (−2β, 0). In this case, the system is fundamentally backward looking, and the solution to Equation (11) is
where ζ t is a sunspot defined by e t = E t−1 e t + ζ t . This variable is an expectational error, uncorrelated -by construction -with the information set, such that E t−1 ζ t = 0. Note that ζ t is serially uncorrelated, and not necessarily correlated with the innovations of ε xd t and ε f t . In other words, this shock may not be a fundamental shock and is purely extrinsic to the economy. A number of different solutions are thus perfectly admissible, with the properties of the economy being rather different depending on the volatility of the sunspot variable and thus that of the real exchange rate via Equation (14).
Use of Equations (10) and (14), following the reasoning leading to expression (13) in the previous subsection, would allow us to characterize the central bank's reaction function in terms of the real interest rate.
In assessing impulse responses of interest rates and exchanges rates, I consider the same two shocks as in the previous subsection, that is, an adverse risk premium shock and a favorable net export shock. In doing so, I neglect for simplicity the sunspot. 20 Figure 6 (top panel) shows that an adverse risk premium shock leaves both the interest rate and real exchange rate unchanged in the first period. 21 The reason for this is twofold. First, in the absence of non-fundamental factors, e t is initially unresponsive as it displays a fully backward-looking behavior in Equation (14). Second, the interest rate is then not affected on impact by changes in the exchange rate, nor does it respond to ε f t in Equation (10). Starting from the second period, the results do not change qualitatively from those discussed for the strong variety of contractionary depreciation. The shock ε f t induces a rise in both interest rates and the real exchange rate. The exchange rate depreciation raises inflation via the pass-through, while also creating contractionary pressures on aggregate demand. In the end, the rise in interest rates makes exchange rates stronger, contributing to limiting inflationary pressures while offsetting negative forces threatening the real side of the economy. 22 As can be seen in Figure 6 (bottom panel), a favorable net export shock raises the interest rate and leaves the real exchange rate unchanged in the first period. There are two reasons for this result. First, the real exchange rate is unchanged in line once more with its backward-looking nature. Second, the interest rate rises in response to an increase in ε x t in Equation (10), once more ignoring the sunspot. The initial interest rate hike offsets the excess demand in the goods market and thereby the inflationary pressures stemming from the shock. Starting from the second period, the results are qualitatively the same as those taking place on impact in the case δ < −2β, but this time extended over a longer time horizon. The reason for this extension is that the exchange rate dynamics in Equation (14) generate persistence in both e t and, via Equation (10), r t . 23 Such dynamics have no consequences in terms of excess demand or inflation, given that the macroeconomic effects of the exchange-rate depreciation and those of the interest rate fall exactly offset each other. Summarizing, the correlation between exchange rates and interest rates, conditional on an adverse risk premium shock, is positive for mildly contractionary depreciations, with both of these variables going up in response to the shock. This result is the same as previously obtained for strongly contractionary ones, except that in the case discussed in the present subsection, such positive correlation is delayed to the second period onwards, with both the interest rate and real exchange rate being left unchanged in the first period. The comparison between the two types of contractionary depreciations is not as straightforward in the case of a net export shock. For a favorable such shock, the dominant feature still is that of a positive correlation between exchange rates and interest rates, with both going down as a consequence of the shock. There are, however, two differences with respect to the case δ < −2β discussed in the previous subsection. First, in the present case when δ ∈ (−2β, 0) the falls in exchange rates and interest rates are delayed to the second period onwards, instead of taking place on impact. Second, also in this latter case, interest rates are raised and the exchange rate is left unchanged in the first period. In any case, economies experiencing either mildly or strongly contractionary depreciations share the result that interest rates are loweredeither on impact or at a later stage -in response to a favorable net export shock.
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The result that the dominant features of economies prone to mildly and strongly contractionary depreciations are broadly similar is new. More specifically, the model predicts that interest rates will be raised to limit the adverse effect of a depreciation on real output arising from either financial or real adverse shocks. In contrast, Eichengreen (2005) reports that interest rates are raised to limit the adverse effect of a depreciation on real output if the latter effect is (unrealistically) strong enough, but not in the case of mildly contractionary depreciations. From a technical point of view, the difference with respect to Eichengreen (2005) arises from the characterization of foreign exchange markets. Both papers look at factor 1 − ω, albeit from different angles. Eichengreen is looking for a sign condition in line with the static nature of his foreign exchange market equilibrium relationship. He thus ranks the strength of contractionary depreciations depending on whether δ is larger or smaller than −β. Instead, as has been made clear above, I look at a stability condition in accordance with the forward-looking character of my UIP condition (Equation (3)). For this reason, I distinguish between mildly and strongly contractionary depreciations when |1 − ω| < 1 and |1 − ω| > 1, respectively.
Finally, let us return to the inconclusive results arising from historical responses to net export shocks, an issue that was discussed in the final paragraph of the previous section. The theoretical results in the first subsection of the third section pointed to the tentative conclusion that other shocks hitting the economy at the same time could have driven EMEs in different directions in response to an apparently similar pattern of shocks. The results obtained in the present subsection suggest that this simple view needs to be qualified. Two other factors may be important under mildly contractionary depreciations. First, the timing of the response of interest rates and exchange rates is not the same for strongly and mildly contractionary depreciations. Second, the latter type of depreciations open the possibility that non-fundamental factors play a role, which if materialized could allow for differential responses even in economies that share their main structural features.
Concluding remarks
The present paper studies the connection between interest rates and exchange rates in small open economies under flexible exchange rates, distinguishing between cases when depreciations are expansionary and contractionary. This is an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and the empirical evidence in emerging economies by modelling interest rate reactions aimed at offsetting variability in foreign exchange markets. Two other policy measures are known to contribute to managed, as opposed to freely, floating exchange rate regimes, namely, foreign exchange intervention and capital controls. Generally, these two measures are considered to be far from explaining the full story. Foreign exchange interventions are found to be effective to dampen volatility under special circumstances, or when they are sizable, which is rarely observed on a sustained fashion. With regard to capital controls, it is generally recognized that there are limits to their effectiveness as market participants can often find ways to circumvent them. Combined use of foreign exchange intervention and capital controls may however allow for smoother fluctuations in exchange rates.
The model results reported here are obtained using a simple open-economy framework that could be extended in a number of directions. For instance, the robustness of the present exercise can be assessed by: (i) formulating a richer dynamic model specification; (ii) incorporating the short term interest rate into the context of a term structure; and (iii) expanding monetary policy's targeting horizon from the current period into a more distant future. Finally, further progress appears to be needed to establish empirically how relevant are any non-fundamental phenomena in the determination of interest rates and exchange rates. 24 60 M. Sanchez 17. I leave the study of the remaining possible values of δ for the next subsection. 18. In particular, the real exchange rate actually depreciates in this case, which indicates that monetary tightening stops short of pushing the value of the currency up, which is what an unconventional contractionary depreciation would induce in this model. 19. For the configuration of parameter values chosen for Figure 5 (bottom panel), an exchange rate appreciation would also add to the inflationary pressures directly stemming from the shock. The reason for this is that the indirect impact of exchange rates on prices via aggregate demand is stronger than the direct one, that is, αδ > γ . 20. The current value of the sunspot ζ t appears in the second to last term of Equation (11). We implicitly neglect that term under the backward solution of the model. In addition, the UIP condition (Equation (3)) now becomes r t = −e t+1 + e t + ε f t . 21. The constancy in the interest rate in the first period should not be taken to reflect 'smoothing'. In particular, it does not stem from an explicit objective of partial adjustment in the policy rule. 22. On top of the dynamics induced by the autoregressive risk premium process, the interest rate and exchange rate are also affected, from the second period onwards, by the dynamics described in Equation (14). 23. This persistence is of a different nature from that resulting from autocorrelated error terms, as is the case with risk premium disturbances throughout the paper. 24. One example of an empirical test for sunspot equilibria is Jeanne and Masson (2000) .
